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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the relationship between population growth and
economic growth in developing countries from 1965 to 1985. Our results
indicate that developing countries were able to shift their labor force from
low-productivity agriculture to the higher-productivity industry and service
sectors, and to increase productivity within those sectors, despite the
rapid growth of their populations. We also find that at given rates of
population growth, income growth is related to the time path of population
growth and that population growth due to high. birth and death rates is
associated with slower income growth than population growth due to
relatively low birth and death rates. Hence, the timing and components of
population growth are important elements in the process of economic
development.
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I.Introduction.
The population of today's less developed countries increased by roughly
1.3 billion people between 1965 and 1985 --anincrease that is larger than
the 1985 population of all of the more developed countries in the world
combined. [1) Despite the fears of 'population pessimists' that rapid
population growth will hinder the growth of per capita income, and the
counter-claims of 'population optimists' that population growth promotes
economic expansion, the empirical evidence shows little relation between the
growth of population and income per head or related economic variables. [2]
Enough countries have simultaneously experienced rapid population and
economic growth and enough have experienced rapid population growth and slow
or negative economic growth to support a 'population neutralist' point of
view that population growth does not necessarily help or impede economic
development. [3]
Population growth can, however occur in various ways: through high
birth rates and moderate or even high death rates, through low birth rates
and lower death rates, through mass immigration, and so forth. Similarly,
changes in the rate of population growth may be caused by changes in birth
rates with roughly constant death rates, changes in death rates with roughly
constant birth rates, or by more complex changes in both fertility and
mortality as in the demographic transition. The impact of population growth
on labor supply and economic well-being may well differ depending on the
reasons underlying the growth.
1In their seminal book detailing the economic benefits of reduced
population growth, Coale and Hoover (1958) focused attention not on growth
per se but rather on declines in fertility, which immediately lower the
number of persons below working age without a concomitant decline in the
size of the labor force.(Indeed, a fertility decline may even result in an
increase in the size of the labor force due to an increase in female labor
force participation.) More recently, Coale (1986) has reiterated the point
that levels of fertility and mortality are likely to affect the growth of
per capita income independently of their difference (which determines
population growth). In support of this point, Coale presents three simple
pieces of empirical evidence relating to different regions of the developing
world between 1960 and 1982:(1) a graph showing little association between
rates of population increase and the growth of per capita income; (2) a
graph showing a pronounced negative association between total fertility
rates and the growth of per capita income; and (3) a graph showing a
positive association between the expectation of life at birth and the growth
of per capita income. This evidence would seem to provide a clear
indication that the growth of income per capita has been weakest in the high
fertility/high mortality regions of the world and that these regions do not
coincide closely with the regions experiencing the most rapid rates of
population growth. It would also appear to constitute evidence in favor of
a 'modified population pessimist view' that a demographic transition is an
important prerequisite for economic development.
In this paper we explore the relation between the time path of
population growth and two major components of population growth -- birthand
death rates -- andthe growth of labor supply, the ratio of persons of
2working age to nonworking age, and economic well-being as reflected in GNP
per capita and other measures of economic development from 1965 to 1985. We
seek to determine the extent to which the 'neutralist' finding that we
reported in our previous work (Bloom and Freeman, 1986) -- thatthere is
little cross-country association between population growth and economic
growth --shouldbe amended or amplified by taking account of the timing and
components of population growth and by considering more recent developing
country experience. Our focus throughout is on the labor market
consequences of population growth, beginning with population-induced
increases in the supply of labor and proceeding to changes in output per
worker and the sectoral allocation of the labor force. As the labor market
consequences of population growth depend not only on labor market factors
but also on the response of capital investment, technology, and the like to
population growth, our empirical findings reflect the behavior of various
markets and soclo-economic agents beyond the labor market as well.
Our major empirical findings, which relate to the time period 1965-
1985, are the following:(1) developing countries were able to shift their
labor forces from low-productivity agriculture to the higher-productivity
industry and service sectors, and to increase productivity within those
sectors, despite the rapid growth of their populations; (2) countries with
similar average rates of population growth had significantly different
patterns of instantaneous population growth and different combinations of
birth and death rates; (3) average rates of population growth tended to be
unrelated to the growth of per capita income over the entire time period,
although they did exhibit a negative relation over the years 1980-1985; (4)
the time profile of population growth is significantly related to income
3growth, with countries experiencing a reduction in population growth tending
to experience more rapid income growth; and (5) the association between
income growth and population growth depends on the level of birth and death
rates, with the relation being slightly negative among countries with high
birth and death rates, and positive among countries with relatively low
birth and death rates.
4II. Labor Supply and the Components of Population Growth
The labor supply forthcoming from a population depends on the number of
persons in different age and sex groups and on the rate of labor force
participation for each of those groups, i.e., the ratio of the number of
individuals who are employed or unemployed and seeking work to the total
number of individuals in the group. [4]The history of fertility,
mortality, and migration directly determines the number of persons in each
age and sex group and is also likely to affect labor supply by influencing
labor force participation rates within those groups, though economic and
cultural factors also significantly influence those rates. [5] In
discussing the effects of population growth on labor supply, we refer to
changes in labor supply due to changes in the size and age structure of the
population at fixed labor force participation rates as "accounting effects"
and to changes in labor supply due to changes in participation rates as
"behavioral" effects.
With regard to accounting effects, there are two main points we wish to
make about the interrelation between the components of population growth and
labor supply. First, we note that changes in fertility and mortality that
have the same effects on population growth can have different effects on the
supply of labor, both immediately when the changes occur and later when the
population achieves a stable form. This relation exists because fertility
and mortality changes have different effects on the age distribution of a
population. To illustrate, consider the two West model stable populations
presented in McNicoll (l984a, p. 187). The first population has a birth
rate of .045 and a death rate of .020 while the second population has a
birth rate of .030 and a death rate of .005. The growth rates of population
5are thus the same, but the age distributions of the population are
different: in the first model, 54 percent of the population falls between
the ages 15 and 64 whereas in the second, 57 percent of the population falls
in that working age category. Although this difference in age distributions
is not great, it illustrates the point that even in stable populations the
magnitude of the components of population growth will affect the age
distribution independently of their crude difference (i.e. ,thecrude growth
rate). Given different labor force participation rates by age, the
magnitudes of the components of growth will therefore also affect the size
of the labor force, and, all else the same, per capita output. It also
follows that the components of changes in the rate of population growth will
exert independent influences on changes in labor supply and, other things
equal, on economic well-being.
Second, in any time period, population growth will alter labor supply
with a lag whose length depends on the reasons underlying the growth. For
example, if population growth is the result of relatively high fertility or
of an age distribution that is heavily concentrated in the childbearing
years, the growth in any one year will have its impact focused at age 0 of
the age distribution. Thus, it will take on the order of 10 to 15 years
before the effects of a particular years population growth begins to affect
the labor force, and 20 to 25 years before the net additions to the
population have a substantial impact on the labor force. [6] On the other
hand, if population growth is mainly the result of substantial in-migration
or of declines in mortality that are evenly spread throughout the age
distribution (as occurs in middle mortality populations) the effects on
labor supply will be more immediate.
6
jOn the behavioral side, we note that fertility increases and mortality
declines are likely to have immediate impacts on labor supply by altering
labor force participation rates. Because childrearing and labor force
participation are both time-intensive activities, declines in fertility could
be expected to have immediate impacts on the size of the female labor force
due to increases in female labor force participation rates. Empirical
evidence on this point is, however, mixed, with participation rates of 30-45
year old women increasing as fertility declines in some countries but not in
others -- presumablyreflecting the importance of cultural factors and
measurement problems related to female labor force participation. [7]
Mortality changes can also affect age-specific labor force participation
rates, and perhaps more importantly, the quality and productivity of the work
force. To the extent that individuals perceive a decline in mortality as
extending their worklife horizons, they may delay entry into the labor force
in order to acquire more education. Indeed, one of the most regular empirical
patterns of change that occurs with development is the declining rate of labor
force participation among the young as they continue in school -- apattern
that would make little economic sense if the young did not forsee increasingly
long working lives.
Looking beyond labor supply issues, population growth is also likely to
have different effects on investment and savings behavior, the composition
of investment, and other broad economic phenonomena depending on the cause
of growth. Growth due to reduced mortality among older persons can be
expected to affect savings rates and is likely to spur greater investment in
medical care facilities. As another example, growth due to increased
fertility will tend to induce more investment in housing and education.
7In sum, a priori analysis supports the view that the effects of any
given level or change in population growth on labor supply and per capita
income depend, at least in part, on both the timing and the underlying
components of that growth or change in growth.
III. Empirical Patterns
We now present empirical evidence on the relationship between
population growth, the components of growth, and changes in population
growth and its components, across developing countries in the 1965-85
period. Most of the statistics we analyze are drawn from publications of
the World Bank, and our analysis follows the conventional grouping of
countries in those publications. Developing countries are classified by
level of GNP per capita into three groups: low-income developing countries,
consisting of 37 countries whose 1985 per capita GNP was less than $400 (the
average per capita income for these countries was $270); lower middle-income
developing countries, consisting of 36 countries with per capita incomes
between $400 and $1600 (average per capita income of $760); and upper
middle-income developing countries, consisting of 23 countries with GNP per
capita above $1600 (average per capita income of $1890). We also present
figures for 19 industrial market economies whose GNP per capita averaged
$11,180. [8]
Table 1 reports several measures of population growth and its
components for countries in each income group. First, we present average
annual rates of population growth over the years 1965 to 1985. These rates
of growth, which are calculated by the World Bank from regressions of the
natural logarithm of population size on a time trend, are the standard
8measures used in analyses of the relationship between population growth and
economic development. Although they reflect a great deal of information
about population growth in each year within the intervals they cover
(including rates of net migration), they are consistent with a variety of
time paths of instantaneous population growth rates (i.e. ,therates of
change in a particular year) and thus, with instantaneous population growth
rates that increase, decrease, or remain stable over time. Based on the
arguments of the preceding section, information on the timing of population
growth has important implications for the growth of the labor force and
therefore for the productive capacity of the population during the time
period over which income growth is measured.
Hence, the second set of measures of population growth we report in
Table 1 are the instantaneous rates of growth in 1965 and 1985. These
growth rates, which are calculated as the differences between crude birth
rates and crude death rates in 1965 and 1985, contain no information on the
contribution of net migration to population growth. Neither do they reflect
information on pdpulation growth in the years between 1965 and 1985.
However, they convey useful information on the time path of the population
growth rate, assuming that path has been approximately linear over time.
The third set of measures related to population growth reported in
Table I are crude birth rates and crude death rates. As discussed above,
these measures are more informative than instantaneous rates of population
growth because they also reveal the position of a population along the
spectrum of the demographic transition. In particular, they allow one to
distinguish between populations that are growing slowly because they have
either not begun the demographic transition (i.e., they have relatively high
9birth rates and high death rates) or because they have more or less
completed the demographic transition (i.e. ,theyhave relatively low birth
rates and low death rates). It is also worth noting that crude birth rates
and death rates reflect the influence of a population's age structure on its
rate of growth and that these rates are simply and usefully related to the
instantaneous population growth rates (i.e., the instantaneous growth rate
equals the crude birth rate minus the crude death rate). It therefore seems
preferable to analyze the components of population growth in terms of these
measures •ratherthan in terms of the measures used by Coale -- thetotal
fertility rate and the expectation of life at birth --thathave neither of
these properties. [9]
The statistics reported in Table 1 reveal several important aspects of
recent demographic experience. First, with the marked exception of China,
average population growth rates were extremely high in developing countries
from 1965 to 1985, with implied doubling times of about 30 years. In
comparison, the implied population doubling time for the industrial market
economies was roughly 100 years. Second, the instantaneous growth rates
show a decelerating trend in population growth. The growth rates in 1985
were below those in 1965 for every country group (except for the low-income
countries, excluding China and India). The example of China is especially
notable in this regard because the population growth rate in China declined
by 1.4 percentage points over just a 20 year period. Such a rapid and
substantial decline suggests that the Chinese population -- whichgrew at
the relatively rapid annual rate of 1.9 percent from 1965 to 1985 --isnow
increasing at a much slower pace than the Chinese labor force, which would
tend to promote the growth of income per capita, other things equal.
10Third, birth and death rates have declined from 1965 to 1985 for all
income groups of developing countries. The declines in the birth rate
ranged from 3 per thousand in the low income countries (exclusive of India
and China) to 20 per thousand in China, while the declines in the death rate
ranged from 2 per thousand in the upper middle-income countries to 8 per
thousand in the lower middle-income countries and India. Moreover, the
birth and death rates do not show similar patterns of decline across country
groups. For example, the decrease in the population growth rate that would
have resulted from just the birth rate declines was offset to widely varying
degrees by the death rate declines across the country groups. Thus, the
structure of demographic change from 1965 to 1985 has not been uniform
across country groups, an indication of the potential importance of taking
account of the components of population growth in studying effects of
population changes on economic development.
It is important to recognize that the averages given in Table 1 mask
substantial country differences in growth rates and in the components of
growth within the same income grouping. With respect to population growth,
among the low-income countries, Kenya and Tanzania had, for example, average
growth rates of 4.1 and 3.5 percent between 1980 and 1985 while Sri Lanka
and Haiti had growth rates of 1.4 and 1.8 percent. As another example,
among upper middle-income economies Iraq and Algeria had population growth
rates of 3.6 and 3.3 percent from 1980 to 1985, roughly five times the rates
in Uruguay and Portugal.
Turning to the components of growth, we present in Table 2 the range of
1985 birth and death rates for countries divided into those above the median
and those below the median in terms of the average annual rate of population
11growth in their income category. The figures reveal a wide range of birth
and death rate experiences for countries with comparable population growth
rates. The statistics also reveal considerable overlap in the birth and
death rate ranges for countries in different income groups. These patterns
highlight the empirical significance of the analytical message conveyed
earlier: that countries with similar population growth rates have different
dombinations of birth and death rates and thus y have very different labor
supply and economic growth experiences.
To evaluate the significance of demographic transition in the period,
we cross-classified developing countries according to whether their crude
birth rates increased 1significantly" (i.e.,bymore than 10 percent),
decreased significantly, or did not move significantly from 1965 to 1985.
Similarly, we divided the countries according to whether their crude death
rates did or did not move up or down significantly. At a very simple level,
the demographic transition model is consistent with a pattern of cross-
classification in which countries experience either (1) significant declines
in both their birth and death rates; (2) a drop in the death rate but no
significant change in the birth rate; (3) a drop in the birth rate with no
significant change in the death rate; or (4) no significant change in either
the birth rate or the death rate. Of the 91 countries in our sample, 82
fell into one of these four cells, with the majority of those (54 percent)
experiencing significant declines in both crude birth rates and crude death
rates (see Table 3). The remaining countries were distributed fairly
randomly across the five cells that are not consistent with the demographic
transition model, although it is notable that not a single developing
country experienced a significant increase in both its birth rate and death
12rate from 1965 to 1985. Insofar as these countries are not unusually
concentrated among country income groups, the demographic transition model
would appear to provide a reasonable construct for viewing the demographic
experience of developing countries over the past two decades.
13IV. Population Growth and Economic Outcomes
In this section we turn from the independent variables that reflect
population growth experiences to outcome variables likely to depend, at
least in part, on population growth. Rather than limiting our analysis to a
single outcome measure --saygrowth of per capita income --weexamine
several variables: labor force growth, the proportion of a population of
working age, and labor force participation rates; the sectoral distribution
of the labor force and sectoral output per worker; and GNP per worker and
per capita. Our concern with the sectoral distribution of the labor force
between agriculture, industry, and services reflects the critical role that
sectoral reallocation of labor has been shown to play in economic
development (see Kuznets, 1965, 1984) and the importance of the traditional
sector/modern sector dichotomy in 'dualistic' models of developing country
labor markets (see Lewis, 1954). The main implication of these models for
the impact of population growth on economic development (discussed at length
in our earlier paper) is that rapid population growth is likely to reduce
the rate at which "surplus labor" in the traditional sector is absorbed into
productive employment and thus to postpone the elimination of economic
dualism and the rise of living standards that characterizes modern economic
growth.
A. Labor Supply
Table 4 presents growth rates of population and labor force forcountry
groups for the periods 1965-1980 and 1980-1985. The statistics document the
fact that changes in the rate of population growth are- not immediately
translated into changes in the rate of labor force growth: except for the
14upper middle-income countries, labor force growth accelerated between 1965-
80 and 1980-85, despite the fact that population growth tended to decelerate
or remain steady. This pattern is most accentuated for China, causing the
labor force-to-population ratio to increase by 1.3 percent per annum between
1980 and 1985 (i.e., the difference between the growth rates of labor force
and population).
To what extent are the observed changes in gross labor force
participation rates the result of "accounting" effects that arise from
shifts in the age distribution toward age groups with relatively high
participation rates and to what extent are the changes the result of
behavioral effects due to changes in labor force participation rates? Table
5 presents evidence that addresses this question. It reports the relative
size of the working age population in different country groups and the ratio
of the labor force (including persons aged less than 15 and over 64) to the
working age population. The figures reveal an increase in the working age
share of population in all income categories from 1965 to 1985 (except the
low-income countries excluding China and India, where the share remained
unchanged), with a remarkable ten point increase in China that brought its
share to levels comparable to those of the industrial market economies. By
contrast, the ratio of the labor force to the population aged 15-64 declined
across country groups, except for a modest increase among the upper middle-
income developing economies. Part of the decline in developing countries is
likely to reflect increased attendance in school. At any rate, both the
"accounting effects" and the "behavioral effects" of population growth on
labor supply are, sizable, although they work in opposite directions and tend
to cancel each other -- perhapsfor the reasons stressed by Easterlin (1968)
15- - theresult being that the labor force-to-population ratio in developing
countries has remained fairly constant over the past two decades.
B. Sectoral Allocation of Labor
We examine next the rate at which the labor force in developing
countries shifted from agricultural to nonagricultural activities and the
level and changes in output per worker among sectors. As in our analysis of
population and labor force, we use World Bank data to examine patterns
across income groups. The three sectors on which the Bank provides data
are: agriculture (encompassing forestry, fishing, and hunting, as well as
agriculture) [10]; industry (manufacturing, mining, construction, and
utilities); and services (defined as a residual category of all economic
activity beyond agriculture and industry). Our focus on the shift of labor
out of agriculture does not imply that agricultural development is
unimportant in the growth process. To the contrary, the shift out of
agriculture is generally accompanied or preceded by sizeable increases in
productivity in agriculture, placing agricultural development at the center
of the labor adjustment process. [11]
The key findings of our analysis are that, despite the unprecedented
magnitude of population growth in the 1965-85 period, developing countries:
(1) shifted their work forces from low-productivity agriculture to the
higher-productivity service sector and to a somewhat lesser extent to the
high-productivity industrial sector; and (2) raised output per worker in all
sectors. In the following section we will examine whether countries with
greater or lesser population growth, or different sources of such growth,
were more or less successful along these dimensions of development.
Table 6 contains the evidence for our first claim: that developing
16countries shifted their work forces out of agriculture during the years 1965
to 1980. It reports the distribution of the labor force across economic
sectors in 1965 and 1980 by country income categories. While we would have
preferred to carry the analysis forward through 1985, 1980 is the latest
year for which we are able to obtain data on the sectoral distribution of
the labor force. Whatever changes occurred from 1980 to 1985 are, in any
case, unlikely to have reversed the pattern of the preceding 15 years.
Comparing the fraction of the labor force engaged in agriculture across
country income groups confirms the well-established fact that agriculture's
share. is inversely related to the level of economic development. Examing
the agricultural share over time shows that the time-series pattern is
roughly consistent with the cross-sectional pattern: the agriculture share
of the labor force fell. Still, agriculture remains the largest employer of
labor in the developing world (save for countries in the upper middle-income
group). [12] Finally, the figures on industry and services show that the
declining share of labor in agriculture coincided mainly with a shift in
labor to the service sector, which tended to be larger than industry in both
1965 and 1980, though here as elsewhere China is exceptional. In the case
of China, the industry share of the labor force increased by 75 percent
between 1965 and 1980 to exceed the services share.
Declines in the share of workers in agriculture in a period of growing
labor supply does not, of course, imply declines in the absolute number of
workers in the sector. Indeed, in the developing world taken as a whole,
the size of the agricultural labor force increased by nearly one-fourth from
1965 to 1980, from 668 million to 823 million individuals. It is notable,
however, that the upper middle-income countries experienced a 10 percent
17decline in the size of their agricultural labor forceduring this period.
[131
Shifts in the distribution of the labor force from agricultureto
services and industry contribute (all else the same) toincreasing income
per capita because sectoral output per worker tends to be higher in industry
and services than in agriculture. We document the differences inoutput per
worker in Table 7, where we report ratios ofgross domestic product per
worker by sector in 1965 and 1980 to the economy-widegross domestic product
per worker. Figures greater than 1.0 indicate that a sector has above-
-
averagelabor productivity. Figures below 1.0 indicate the reverse. In all
of the developing country groups, agriculture has markedlybelow-average
labor productivity whereas industry has the highest productper worker. In
the industrial market economies, by contrast, and to agrowing extent in the
upper middle-income developing countries, output per worker in industry is
roughly at the economy-wide average.
To estimate the contribution of shifts in the distribution of the labor
force to the growth of GDP per worker in theeconomy as a whole, we have
used the 1965 and 1980 relative GDP per worker figures as"productivity
weights", and calculated the percentage change in GDP per worker
attributable to the observed changes in the distribution of the laborforce:
this is simply the sum of the productivity weights multipliedby the change
in shares. The results, summarized in Table 8, show that thechanges in the
sectoral distribution of labor contributed importantly to observed
productivity growth, whichever set of weights is used. This pattern is
especially strong in China, where between one-third and one-half of the
growth in GDP per head from 1965 to 1980 is attributable to the shift in
18labor force out of agriculture.
C. Output Per Worker
In the pessimists' scenario, population-induced increases in labor
supply have adverse consequences for productivity per worker, particularly
in the 'labor surplus' agricultural sector. Did the 1965-1980 increase in
labor force reduce sectoral productivity in developing countries in accord
with this view?
The figures in Table 9 suggest that it did not. Indeed, exactly the
opposite occurred in this period of rapid population growth: for each
sector, the growth of GDP exceeded the growth of the labor force -- forall
income groups of economies. The net result of increasing output per worker
by sector and shifts in the distribution of the labor force towards more
productive sectors are increases in COP per worker in the overall economy.
Finally, while there was some decline in labor force per capita from
1965 to 1985 in developing countries, its effect on per capita output was
dwarfed by the increase in per worker output, the net result being a large
increase in per capita output. While this pattern does not imply that
population growth over this period contributed to economic development, nor
rule out the possibility that it hindered development, it certainly gainsays
the worst fears of the population pessimists. Despite population increasing
rapidly --morerapidly than the labor force until the 1980s --developing
countries managed, on the whole, to improve their economic positions
significantly.
19V. Effects of the Timing and Components of Population Growth
In this section, we turn our attention to the following two questions:
(1) Whether over the past two decades, countries with more rapid
population growth had relatively better or worse rates of economic
development than countries with less rapid population growth?
(2) Whether differences in the timing and components of population
growth had affected the rate of economic growth in countries with the same
overall rate of population growth?
As both of these questions relate to differences in performance among
countries, we change analytic focus and technique. Instead of examining
averages for groups of countries, we use a multiple regression model to
relate indicators of economic development for individual countries to growth
rates of population, and to levels of birth and death rates. Our
observations consist of all developing countries in the World Bank data set
for which the requisite data are available. To differentiate between
countries with differing levels of income and other circumstances, we
include in all of our specifications the log of 1965 per capita GNP and a
vector of dununy variables relecting each country's regional location.
Table 10 presents the results of regressing the rate of growth of
several economic outcomes on the rate of growth of population for the
periods 1965-85, 1965-80 (recall that labor force distribution figures are
available only through 1980) and, for 1980-85. While the statistical
analysis shows some positive and some negative associations between
population growth and economic outcomes, the overriding pattern of results
provides no support for the population optimist point of view, and some
support for both the neutralist and pessimist views. The best single
20summary measure of outcome growth of CD? per capita --isessentially
unrelated to the growth of population over the long run. Labor force per
capita is negatively related to the growth of population from 1965 to 1980
and from 1965 to 1985, but its effect on the growth of per capita output is
offset by the statistically weak but positive relation between the rate of
growth of population and the growth of GDP per laborer shown in the third
row of estimates.
In the 1980-1985 period, by contrast, population growth is negatively
associated with growth of CDP per capita, with an increased negative
coefficient on the growth of labor force per capita and a negative rather
than positive association with growth of GD? per worker. This pattern of
results suggests that, in a weak world economy, countries with rapid
population growth (which cannot be "turned off" readily) may be at greater
risk of suffering setbacks in economic growth than countries with less rapid
population growth. [14] Although we are reluctant to extrapolate or
generalize from this relatively short period of time, this evidence does
favor the population pessimist view.
Looking within sectors, the data reject strongly the implications of
the dualistic labor market model that faster population growth reduces the
movement out of agriculture and retards growth of labor productivity in
agriculture. The regression estimates show exactly the opposite: more
rapid reductions in the share of the labor force in agriculture and more
rapid increases in GDP per worker in agriculture in countries with faster
rates of population growth, though neither relation is exceptionally strong.
The most sensible interpretation of these regressions is that population
growth has little or, at most, a weak relation to the sectoral allocation of
21labor and to labor productivity within sectors.
We now turn to the relation of per capita income, labor force, and
productivity to the timing and components of population growth. First, we
replace the average population growth rate with the instantaneous population
growth rates in 1965 and 1985 in the regression equations in Table 10. This
specification provides us with a measure of the association between the
acceleration/deceleration of population growth and the indicators of
economic development. As can be seen in the first panel of Table 11, past
population growth is positively associated with labor force participation,
labor productivity, and GNP per capita while the present rate of population
growth is negatively associated with those same variables. Second, in panel
2 of Table 11 we replace the 1965 and 1985 population growth rates by their
difference and control for the average rate of population growth. Here we
see that while average population growth has no relation to the growth of
per capita income, countries with more sharply declining rates of population
growth tend to have a higher rate of per capita income growth, both because
they are able to enjoy higher rates of labor force per capita and because of
increases in GDP per worker. In part, these findings reflect the lag
between growth of population and labor force, as countries with declining
rates of growth will tend to have an older population, and thus a higher
proportion of their population concentrated in the working ages and
generating savings that can be used to finance investments in both human and
physical capital that will generate returns relatively quickly. Overall,
these results provide strong evidence that the time path of population
growth exerts an influence on economic development that is independent of
the level of population growth. The results modify, but do not contradict,
22the population neutralist view that we expressed in our earlier work, as
different steady states of population growth are estimated to have
essentially no effect on per capita income growth.
In panel 3 of Table 11 we report the results of regressions with crude
birth rates and crude death rates in 1965 and 1985 included as regressors.
These specifications essentially break up the instantaneous growth rates in
panel 1 into their components. However, the estimates provide relatively
little additional insight beyond that gained from the constrained estimates
reported in panel 1. At the margin, high birth rates in the past are
associated with higher growth rates of labor force, labor productivity, and
output per capita, while high birth rates in the present are associated with
slower growth of labor force, productivity, and output per capita. Death
rates tend to have an association with labor force growth that is opposite
in sign to that of birth rates, but of greater magnitude. This pattern is
probably due to the fact that changes in the death rate in most developing
countries partly reflect improvements in infant and child mortality, which
are demographically similar to increased birth rates, and partly reflect
reduced mortality in the working ages that has a more immediate effect on
the size of the labor force. The one puzzling result in the table is that
the coefficients on the death rate in 1985 do not have equal and opposite
signs to those on the birth rate in 1985 in the regressions for CNP per
capita and per worker. Perhaps further decomposition of death rates by age
is needed here.
The estimates in panel 4 of Table 11 are from a regression
specification in which the coefficient on the average annual rate of
population growth from 1965 to 1985 is allowed to depend on the level of
23fertility and mortality. In particular, we divided the sample into thirds
according to the sum of birth rates and death rates for different countries.
By interacting the population growth rate with dummy variables reflecting
which of the three groups each country falls into, we are able to test
whether population growth affects economic development differently for
countries at different stages of the demographic transition. The estimates
indicate that the insignificant correlation between population growth and
the growth of GNP per capita (.01, with a standard error of .36 --not
reported in Table 10 where we focus instead on GD? per capita) is an average
of (1) a moderately-sized positive relation among countries with the lowest
birth and death rates (i.e. ,countriesthat tend to be closest to completing
the demographic transition), (2) a small positive (and imprecise) relation
among countries that were in the midst of the demographic transition over
the years 1965 to 1985, and (3) a small (and imprecise) negative relation
for countries that had not begun the demographic transition. For all three
groups of countries, population growth is negatively associated with the
growth of labor force per capita, with the strength of the association
tending to be strongest for those countries with moderate and high birth and
death rates. By contrast, productivity growth shows little association with
population growth among the high fertility/mortality populations and is
positively related to population growth among the low and middle
fertility/mortality populations. The positive link between population
growth and productivity and per capita income growth for the low
fertility/mortality group represents the only evidence we have found that is
consistent with the population optimist view that population growth promotes
economic development. As the results for the other two country groups do
24not show such a pattern, however, the safest generalization appears to be
the neutralist view that the overall effect of population growth on economic
development is negligible although its impact seems to differ depending on
the levels of birth and death rates.
•In sum, the estimates in Table 11 support the view that it is useful to
go beyond simple correlations between average rates of population growth and
economic development to consider the relation between the timing of
population growth and the underlying components of that growth and economic
development. The next step in the analysis should be to examine these
relations in a broader model that considers not only the impact of
population growth on per capita income but also the feedback effects of
economic development on population growth.
25VI. Conclusion
This paper has reported the results of research on the relationships
between the timing and components of population growth and the economic
growth experienced by developing countries from 1965 to 1985. The results
indicate that developing countries were able to shift their labor force from
low-productivity agriculture to the higher-productivity industry and service
sectors, and to increase productivity within those sectors, despite the
rapid growth of their populations. We also find that at given rates of
population growth, income growth is related to the time path of population
growth and that population growth due to high birth and death rates is
associated with slower income growth than population growth due to
relatively low birth and death rates. Hence, the timing and components of
population growth appear to be important elements in the process of economic
development.
26Notes
1. By developed countries we mean Western Europe, Australia, New Zealand,
Japan, Canada, and the United States, as indicated in the World Development
Report 1987 (World Bank, 1987). Except for countries with mid-1984
populations below one million, high-income oil exporters, and East European
non-market economies, all other countries are considered less developed,
despite the wide range of industrialization and income per capita among
them.
2. See Bloom and Freeman, 1986.
3. See Bloom and Freeman, 1986.
4. We limit our discussion to the size of the labor force, to the exclusion
of other important aspects of supply, such as hours worked and the
education, skill, and motivation of the labor force. These characteristics,
while imporant determinants of a country's productive capacity, raise issues
that are beyond the scope of this paper.
5. Easterlin (1968) presents evidence that rapid growth of the population of
working age in the U.S. was associated with slower growth of labor force
participation rates.
6. This simple insight into the dynamic relationship between population and
labor force growth underlay some of the main results derived by Coale and
Hoover (1958) in one of the earliest neoclassical treatments of the
relationship between population and economic growth.
7.See Durand (1975) for a thorough empirical study of labor force
27.participation rates in less developed countries. See Standing (1976), Dixon
(1982), and Anker (1983) for thorough treatments of the problems involved in
measuring the labor force participation of women in developing countries.
8. Countries for which per capita GNP data are either unavailable or
unreliable are classified on the basis of characteristics likely to be
correlated with income. These countries are not included in the regression
analyses reported below.
9.See Entwisle (1981) for some further analysis of this issue.
10. Since much agricultural production in developing countries is not
exchanged, the World Bank has imputed part of its value for many countries.
11. Ideally, we would also like to analyze the wage effects of rapid
population growth. Unfortunately, the sketchy and unreliable nature of wage
data for most developing countries render such an analysis beyond the scope
of this paper. However, we will analyze variations in a kindred measure --
outputper worker --acrosssectors and over time.
12. See Kuznets (1984) for a detailed analysis of the decline of
agricultural employment.
13. See the data in the 1987 World Development Report.
14. One possible reason for this is that the world economic slowdown may
compress rates of growth of GDP across countries, so that given rates of
population growth have more adverse effects on per capita income growth.
Another possibility is that the 1980-1985 period is simply a short-run
aberration.
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1985 growth ratespopulation growth
population (percent) rates (percent)
Type of economy (millions) 1965-85 19651985Change
Low-income 2415.3 2.2 2.6 1.9 -0.7
China 1040.3 1.9 2.6 1.2 -1.4
India 765.1 2.3 2.5 2.1 -0.4
Other 609.8 2.7 2.5 2.8 0.3
Lower middle-income672.0 2.5 2.7 2.5 -0.2
Upper middle-income567.2 21 2.5 1.9 -0.6







Type of economy 19651985 Change 19651985Change
Low-income 43 29 -14 17 10 -7
China 39 19 -20 13 7 -6
India 45 33 -12 20 12 -8
Other 46 43 -3 21 15 -6
Lower middle-income44 36 -8 17 11 -B
Upper middle-income36 28 -8 11 9 -2
Industrial market 20 13 -7 9 9 0
Source: World Bank(1987).Table 2. Ranges of birth and death rate experiences with different
rates of population growth, by type of economy, 1985.
Countries with above average population growth
rates within their income group
Birth rate plus
Birth rate Death rate death rate (per
(per thousand(per thousandthousand
Type of economy population) population) population
Low-income 34 -54 8 -21 42 -72
Lower middle-income 33 -49 7 -16 40 -65
Upper middle-income 17 -44 5 -14 23 -58
Industrial market 19 -23 6 -9 25 -31
Countries with below average population growth
rates within their income group
Birth rate plus
Birth rate Death rate death rate (per
(per thousand(per thousandthousand
Type of economy population) population) population
Low-income 19 -50 6 -26 26 -76
Lower middle-income 22 -50 4 -21 29 -69
Upper middle-income 12 -26 6 -13 23 -33
Industrial market 16 -19 9 -12 26 -30
Source: Authors' calculations from World Bank (1987).Table 3. Number of economies within each income group, by birth and
death rate experiences, 1965-85.
Increase in No change in Decrease in
birth rate birth rate birth rate
Increase in 0 low-income 1 low-income 0 low-income
death rate 0 lower 0 lower 0 lower
middle-income middle-income middle-income
o upper 2 upper 4 upper
middle -income middle -income middle -income
O all developing 3 all developing 4 all developing
No change in 0 low-income 1 low-income 0 low-income
death rate 0 lower 0 lower 0 lower
middle -income middle -income middle -income
O upper 2 upper 3 upper
middle-income middle-income middle-income
O all developing 3 all developing 3 all developing
Decrease in 1 low-income 22 low-income 9 low-income
death rate 1 lower 9 lower 24 lower
middle -income middle -income middle -income
o upper 1 upper 11 upper
middle -income middle -income middle -income
2 all developing 32 all developing 44 all developing
Source: World Bank (1987).
Note: An increase or decrease in the birth or death rate is defined
here as a change of ten percent or more from the 1965 birth or death
rate.Table 4. Growth rates of population and labor force, by type of
economy, 1965-80 and 1980-85.
Differences in
Average annualAverage annual growth rates
population labor force (labor force
growth rates growth rates minus
(percent) (percent) population)
Type of economy 1965-80 1980-851965-80 1980-851965-80 1980-85
Low-income 2.3 1.9 2.1 2.3 -0.2 0.4
China 2.2 1.2 2.4 2.5 0.2 1.3
India 2.3 2.2 1.7 2.0 -0.6 -0.2
Other 2.7 2.7 2.2 2.5 -0.5 -0.2
Lower middle-income2.5 2.5 2.4 2.6 -0.1 0.1
Upper middle-income2.2 2.0 2.6 2.3 0.4 0.3
Industrial market 0.9 0.6 1.3 1.0 0.4 0.4
Source: World Bank(1987).Table 5. Breakdown of labor force per capita, by type of economy,
1965 and 1985.
Population Labor force
Labor force aged 15-64 per person
per capita (percent aged 15-64
(percent) (of population)(percent)
Type of economy 1965 1985 1965 1985 1965 1985
Low-income 46 45 54 59 85 76
China 45 50 55 65 82 77
India 41 37 54 56 76 66
Other 38 35 52 52 73 67
Lower middle-income 38 37 52 55 73 67
Upper middle-income 36 38 56 58 64 66
Industrial market n.a. n.a. 63 67 n.a. n.a.
Source: World Bank(1986, 1987).
n.a. =notavailableTable 6.Percent distribution of labor force across economic sectors,
by type of economy, 1965 and 1980.
Type of economy
Percent of thelabor force in
Agriculture Industry Services











































Source: World Bank(1987).Table 7. Cross domestic product per worker, for each sector, relative
to gross domestic product per worker in the economy as a whole, by
type of economy, 1965 and 1980.
Type of economy [a]
Agriculture Industry Services











































Source: World Bank (1982,1984, 1987)and Table 6.
* 1980figures are 1982 GDP share divided by 1980 labor share. GDP
figures for 1980 are not separately available for the lower and upper
middle-income countries.
[a] Figures are not completely comparable because some countries
have changed income groups over the period.Table 8.Estimates of the percentage change in GD? per worker attri-
butable to shifts in the sectoral distribution of labor, by country












Lower middle-income 16.8 15.8
Upper middle-income 19.3 16.4
Industrial market 6.5 0.5
Source: Tables 6 and 7, calculated by applying 1980 distribution of
labor force to 1965 relative GDPs per worker and 1965 distributions of
labor force to 1980 relative GDPs per worker.Table 9. Percent increase of real GDP and of the labor force by
sector from 1965 to 1980 by type of economy.
Real GDP
Type of economy OverallAgricultureIndustryServices
Low-income 102.0 49.1 200.0 107.9
Middle-income 157.2 67.5 200.0 164.5
Industrial market 72.5 19.6 70.0 77.5
Labor force
Type of economy OverallAgricultureIndustryServices
Low-income 36.6 27.7 97.3 46.4
Middle-income 44.8 11.2 95.9 82.3
Industrial market 21.4 -39.3 11.8 46.6
Source: Authors' calculations using data contained in World Bank
(1987)Table 10. Regression estimates of the effect of population growth on
measures of economic growth and development in developing countries,
1965-80, 1980-85, and 1965-85. [a]







GDP per capita 0.24 (0.33)-0.86 (0.49)-0.05 (0.34)
Labor force per capita -0.30 (0.09)-0.42 (0.10)-0.30 (0.09)










Change in the percent of







[a] The coefficients are fromregressionsof the measure of economic
growth or development on the average annual percentage increase in
population, the natural logarithm of GNP per capita in 1965, and six
regional dummy variables. The measures of economic growth or develop-
ment are average annual growth rates except for the changes in the
percent of the labor force by sector, which are raw differences in the
percent of the labor force in each sector. All dependent variables,
as well as the average annual growth in population, are measured in
percentage points. The regions used in the regressions are Sub-
Saharan Africa, Middle East and North Africa, East Asia and Pacific,
South Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Southern Europe.
Care was taken to use the most complete set of data possible. The
regressions of growth rates of GDP per capita, labor force per capita,
and CD? per worker in the whole economy are regressions from samples
with of 75 observations. Because of the nature of the data
constraints, however, the sample sizes for the sectoral regression
estimates range from El to 77 observations.
[b] Estimated standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Data source: World Bank (1982, 1983, 1987).Table 11. Regression estimates of the effect of demographic variables




(Average annual growth rates)
GNP Labor force GDP
coefficients[b] per capita per capita perworker
Model 1:
P0P65 1.58 (0.50) 0.61 (0.11) 0.92 (0.49)
P0P85 -1.79 (0.50)-0.69 (0.11) -0.80 (0.49)
Model 2:
AVPOP 0.24 (0.33) -0.22 (0.07) 0.49 (0.32)
(P0P85 -P0P65) -1.74 (0.46)-0.60 (0.10)-0.98 (0.44)
Model 3:
BIRTH6S 0.50 (0.59) 0.54 (0.14) 0.06 (0.59)
RIRTH8S -1.10 (0.59) -0.58 (0.14) -0.35 (0.59)
DEATH65 -0.70 (1.00) -0.92 (0.24) 0.29 (1.00)
DEATH85 -1.30 (1.21) 0.91 (0.28) -2.24 (1.21)
Model 4:
AVPOP *LOW 0.73 (0.47) -0.13 (0.11) 0.78 (0.43)
AVPOP *MID 0.30 (0.39) -0.33 (0.09) 0.59 (0.37)
AVPOP *HIGH -0.20 (0.36) -0.30 (0.09) 0.21 (0.34)
[a] The coefficients are from regressions of the dependent variable
on the listed independent variables. In addition, all four models
also include, as independent variables, six regional dummy variables
and the natural logarithm of 1965 GNP per capita. The regions used in
the regressions are the same as those used in Table 10, and each
regression was fit on a sample of 75 observations.
[b] Estimated standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Data source: World Bank (1983, 1987).Definitions of independent variables used in regressions in Table 11.
Independent variable Explanation
AVPOP Average annual population growth, 1965-85
(percentage points)
P0P65 Annual population growth rate, 1965
(percentage points)
P0P85 Annual population growth rate1 1985
(percentage points)
BIRTII65 Annual birth rate, 1965
(births per hundred population)
B1RT1185 Annual birth rate, 1985
(births per hundred population)
DEATH6S Annual death rate, 1965
(deaths per hundred population)
DEATH8S Annual death rate, 1985
(deaths per hundred population)
LOW A dummy variable equal to one for countries
in the lowest third of developing countries
ranked by values of birth rate plus death
rate (average of 1965 and 1985 values), and
equal to zero otherwise.
MID A dummy variable equal to one for countries
in the middle third of developing countries
ranked by values of birth rate plus death
rate (average of 1965 and 1985 values), and
equal to zero otherwise,
HIGH A dummy variable equal to one for countries
in the high third of developing countries
ranked by values of birth rate plus death
rate (average of 1965 and 1985 values), and
equal to zero otherwise.